Sudan's Civil War: Competing Forces, Collapsed State

Sudan's civil war, which erupted on April 15, 2023, has produced one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises within a period of roughly three years. The conflict pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the country's conventional military, against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a heavily armed paramilitary organization that grew from the Janjaweed militias responsible for atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s. An estimated 150,000 people have been killed since the war began in April 2023 through December 2025, according to the US envoy for Sudan and international organisations (Dabanga Sudan, 2025-12-24) — other researcher estimates that account for indirect deaths from disease and starvation range considerably higher — and 14 million people, a quarter of Sudan's population comprising 9 million internally displaced and 4.4 million who have fled across borders, have been forced to flee, making this the world's largest displacement crisis (UNHCR, via UN News, 2026-04-10).

Background

The RSF was formally created in 2013 under then-President Omar al-Bashir as a counterterrorism force and internal security tool. Following Bashir's ouster in the 2019 popular uprising, RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo — known as Hemedti — emerged as a powerful political and military figure. Under the October 2021 military coup, SAF General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Hemedti jointly ruled Sudan, but tensions over the RSF's integration into the regular military command structure — and its economic interests in gold mining and regional security contracts — produced an irreparable split.

Fighting began in Khartoum on April 15, 2023, rapidly spreading to Darfur, Kordofan, and other regions. The RSF captured most of Khartoum within weeks. The SAF retained control of major military installations and air power.

Current Situation

The SAF, supported by Egyptian military assistance and regional backing, contested RSF control of Khartoum and key population centers through 2023 and 2024. As of 2026, the SAF holds Khartoum — recaptured from the RSF in a series of operations concluding in late March 2025 (FDD's Long War Journal, 2025-04-01) — along with the north and east of the country, while the RSF has consolidated control over most of Darfur; both sides maintain a military presence in contested areas of Kordofan (per territorial control mapping by Sudans Post, 2026-06-21).

Khartoum — once a city of 7 million — has been largely emptied. Major hospitals, universities, and government buildings have been destroyed or occupied. The UN has documented mass atrocities in Darfur, including massacres of ethnic non-Arab communities in El Fasher and surrounding towns, consistent with patterns from the 2003–04 Darfur genocide.

Famine conditions were confirmed in El Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan) as of September 2025, with 20 additional areas assessed as being at risk (IPC Famine Review Committee, 2025-09). Aid organizations describe restricted humanitarian access as both parties block relief convoys.

Key Actors and External Involvement

The SAF receives political and some material support from Egypt, which views a stable, SAF-led Sudan as critical to Nile water security and regional stability. Saudi Arabia and the UAE initially attempted mediation but diverged: the UAE is widely reported to provide the RSF with arms and financial support, allegedly routed through Libya and Chad. Egypt backs the SAF. This external proxy dimension has significantly prolonged and intensified the conflict.

African Union and UN-sponsored peace negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere have produced no durable ceasefire. The United States has imposed targeted sanctions on both SAF and RSF leadership.

Outlook

The most likely near-term trajectory is continued fragmentation, with neither the SAF nor RSF achieving total military victory. A de facto partition of Sudan along current territorial control lines is increasingly discussed by analysts, though neither party has accepted this framing. The humanitarian situation is expected to worsen as the conflict enters its third and fourth years without international intervention adequate to the scale of the crisis.

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